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RECENT CASES
gated the husband's common law action for loss of consortium since the wife
can sue in her own name.8 It is difficult to conclude that laws designed to
repudiate the inferiority of the wife shall be construed so as to eliminate her
cause of action. Here the courts are remedying the wrongful denial of a
cause of action to one by denying it to the other also.9
There have been no decisions in North Dakota on the right of the wife to
recover from a negligent third party for loss of consortium. However, Milde
v. Leigh' said a personal injury to the wife, either negligently or intentionally
caused, gives rise to a cause of action by the husband. And in Rott v. Goehr-
ing'1 and King v. Hanson12-cases where the wife was allowed damages for
alienation of affection-the court maintained that statute has greatly changed
the wife's rights and removed many disabilities she formerly possessed. Con-
sequently, it seems a North Dakota court would be inclined to rule that a
case brought by a wife for loss of consortium due to negligence would state
a good cause of action.
SERGE H. GARRISON.
JURIEs - TALESMEN OR ADDITIONAL JURoRs - SELECTION AND ERROR. - The
panel having been exhausted in the defendant's sodomy-murder trial, the
judge ordered the sheriff to summon talesmen. The final juror, chosen from
among those produced by the under-sheriff, was examined and sworn in. On
the third day of actual trial, upon learning of the method of selection by the
under-sheriff, the defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the final
juror was not summoned in accordance with statute.' The under-sheriff testi-
fied that he telephoned officers of eight large companies requesting that em-
ployees be dispatched for jury duty. Two telephone employees went directly
to the courtroom without contacting the under-sheriff. One of these was
selected as the final juror. On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court held,
one justice dissenting, that the under-sheriff did not abuse his discretion and in
any case, no showing of prejudice had been made. State v. Sturdivant, 155
A.2d 771 (N.J. 1959).
The practice of summoning talesmen upon default in the regular panel
sprang up in common-law England and as early as the 16th century was sanc-
tioned by statute.- These talesmen, or bystanders, as with regular jurors at
common law were summoned by the sheriff, and this procedure is still fol-
lowed unless specifically modified by statute.3 A tales implies the making up
8. Marri v Stamford Street Ry., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911); Blair v. Seitner Dry
Goods Co:, 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915); Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224
N.C. 821,'32 S.E.2d 611 (1945).
9. See Montgomery v. Stephan, 101 N.W.2d 227 (Mich. 1960).
10. 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947).
11. 33 N.D. 413, 157 N.W. 294 (1916).
12. 13 N.D. 85, 99 N.W. 1085 (1904).
1. "... the sheriff or other proper officer shall forthwith summon, from among the
bystanders or others, such additional number of persons qualified to serve as jurors as may
be ordered by the court, and make return theerof immediately . N.J.S. 2A: 74-10,
N.J.S.A.
2. See 1 THOMPSON TRIALS 30 (2d ed. 1934); 3 LEWIS'S BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES §§ 364-365 (1897) "... by virtue of the statute 35 Hen. VIII c. 6,
and other subsequent statutes, the judge is empowered at the prayer:-of either party to
award a tales de circumstantibus, of persons present in court, to be'joined to the other
jurors to try the cause; who are liable however to the same challenges as the principal
jurors."
3. Bruce v. State, 169 Miss. 355, 152 So. 490 (1934).
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of a deficiency and would not be granted where there was an entire default of
jurors.
4
In the calling and discharging of these additional jurors the court is
allowed a large measure of discretion.5 The judge's discretion has even been
extended to ruling on the bias of talesmen as a question of fact, a finding
which would be final in the absence of apparent abuse.6 Yet this is a judicial
discretion and must be exercised in a reasonable manner to carry out the
purpcse of the statutes.7
The sheriff or other officer empowered to select and summon talesmen is
vested with some discretion in his task of securing qualified jurors8 and may
refuse persons he believes would be disqualified.9 The sheriff or the court
may even have previously obtained persons to serve as talesmen.1° Yet the
courts look askance at this procedure when the lists are furnished by one of
the litigants.11 Bias of the summoning officer is always good grounds for
challenge to the jury, the statutory test usually being the officer's qualifica-
tion to sit as a juror. 12 Here too the disqualification of the officer may be at
the discretion of the court1 3 or it may be mandatory upon objection by one of
the parties.
14
Upon disqualification of the sheriff at common law his duties devolve upon
the coroner and upon disqualification of the coroner to court appointed
elisors. 15 This method may be specifically stated in the statutes.1 6 The im-
partiality of the summoning officer has been given such emphasis by the
courts that at least one case has stated contempt proceedings are proper
against an officer acting with prejudice.'7 In the absence of evidence to the
contrary a number of courts hold there is a presumption in favor of the
regularity and legality of these proceedings,8 whether the questioned act be
4. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 776, 162 S.E. 1 (1932); 1 THOMPSON,
TRIALS 31 (2d ed. 1934).
5. State v. Dreher, 166 La. 924, 118 So. 85 (1928) (The number of persons selected
is at the discretion of the court); Tarrence v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.2d 40 (Ky. 1953),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 899, (1954).
6. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 255 Mass. 369, 151 N.E. 839 (1926).
7. State v. Porter, 125 Mont. 503, 242 P.2d 984 (1951) (Not merely because pros-
pective jurors were far enough away to incur milage fees).
8. Cavens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
733 (1933).
9. State v. Butler, 221 S.W.2d 160 (Mo. 1949).
10. Morgan v. Sun Oil Co., 109 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
640 (1940); Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289
U.S. 733 (1933).
11. See Knox v. State, 160 Miss. 494, 135 So. 206 (1931) (Contempt proceedings
were instituted against the attorney who furnished a list of prospective talesmen for the
sheriff, though later dismissed).
12. State v. Kent, 4 N.D. 577, 62 N.W. 631 (1895); Roof v. State, 34 Okla. Crim.
145, 245 Pac. 666, 667 (1926) "It is essential to the fair and impartial administration
of justice that an open or special venire shall be summoned by an officer who is not dis-
qualified by reason of interest, bias or prejudice."
13. State v. Young, 314 Mo. 612, 286 S.W. 29, 32 (1926) . unless there is
some showing that the discretion exercised was arbitrary and unjust, the action of the
court will not be overruled."
14. Montez v. People, 110 Colo. 208, 132 P.2d 970 (1942).
15. Ibid. (The statute did not provide for the disqualification of the sheriff and the
subsequent appointment of the coroner and elisors).
16. Commonwealth v. Bruno, 324 Pa. 236, 188 Atd. 320 (1936).
17. Hargo v. United States, 1 Okla. Crim. 590, 98 Pac. 1021 (1909) (The deputy
marshall questioned individuals concerning their acquaintance with the defendant's
attorney and refused to summon those who were so acquainted).
18. See State v. Lee, 78 N.D. 489, 50 N.W.2d 124, 128 (1951) "The presumption
is that the statutes were followed in drawing the jury." Accord, Lindsay v. State, 69 Fla.
641, 68 So. 932 (1915).
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by an officer-o or the court.2 0 Thus an affirmative showing of prejudice can be
required21 and substantial compliance with the statute is sufficient.22 In this
regard the particular wording of the statute may be determinative.23  How-
ever it has been stated as an over-riding premise that the duty of selecting
persons to act as jurors cannot be delegated.24
In summary it may be said that though the courts may state as a principle
that there must be strict compliance with the statutes in jury selection25 in
their application to the summoning of talesmen a good measure of discretion
is given the court and its officers.
J. PHILLIP JOHNSON.
LIBEL - QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE - DOES A MERCANTILE AGENCY ENJOY A
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE. - Plaintiff sought to recover from defendant credit
agency for falsely reporting to an insurance company to which plaintiff was
applying for insurance that plaintiff was an excessive drinker. The complaint
made no allegation of actual malice. The trial judge sustained a demurrer to
the action. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held, in part, that without an
allegation of actual malice the complaint did not state a cause of action because
the credit agency had a conditional privilege. The dissent felt that the in-
formation in this case was volunteered and the conditional privilege should
apply only to requested information. Barker v. Retail Credit Co., 100 N.W.2d
391 (Wisc. 1960).
The vast majority of the courts have held that a mercantile agency has a
qualified privilege to communicate information to a subscriber, who has a
genuine interest in such information;' however, the communication is not
privileged if actual malice can be shown. 2 Malice has been implied by some
19. Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
733, (1933). See Trapper v. State, 129 Tex. Crim. 53, 84 S.W.2d 726 (1935).
20. Begeman v. Smith, 94 Ind. App. 513, 154 N.E. 806 (1927).
21. Morgan v. Sun Oil Co., 109 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 640
(1940); State v. Burris'. 204 La. 608. 16 So.2d 124 (1944).
22. City of Holdenville v. Deer, 191 Okla. 691, 132 P.2d 928 (1943). See State v.
Hailey, 350 Mo. 300, 165 S.W.2d 422 (1942).
23. People v. Kelhoffer, 181 Misc. 731, 48 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1943) (Legislative sub-
stitution of the word "may" for the word "shall" made the method of selection per-
mussive rather than mandatory). See also N.D. Rev. Code §§ 29-1709 and 29-1713
(1943) (Selection of talesmen-criminal procedure) which provide: ". . . the court
inay order the sheriff to summon . . ."; N.D. Rev. Code § 27-0921 (1943) (Selection of
talesmen--civil procedure) providing: ". . . the court shall order the sheriff, deputy
sheriff, or coroner to summon . . ."
24. Dunn v. United States, 238 Fed. 508 (5th Cir. 1917). But see, Collazo v. United
States, 196 F.2d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
25. E.g., State v. Kelly, 100 Conn. 727, 125 Atl. 95 (1924); Kitchen v. Common-
wealth, 275 Ky. 564, 122 S.W.2d 121 (1938); State v. McGoldrick, 361 Mo. 737, 236
S.W.2d 306 (1951).
1. H. E. Crawford Company v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1957); Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 194 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1952);
Pomeroy v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 146 F.Supp. 59 (D. Ore. 1956); Pollasky v.
Minchener, 81 Mich. 280, 46 N.W. 5 (1890); Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868);
Cullum v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 228 S.C. 384, 90 S.E.2d 370 (1955).
2. H. E. Crawford Company v. Dun and Bradstreet, Inc., 241 F.2d 387 (4th Cir.
1957); Omsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477 (1868); Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S.C.
490, 38 S.E.2d 643 (1946) (Ordinarily, proof of defamatory publication. makes out a
prima facie case of malice, but a privileged communication is an exception to the rule
requiring plaintiff to show malice in fact).
